Wednesday 14th of October 2026
Home » Blogs » Gus Leonisky's blog

orstraya paces towards its quota of fascism.....

Australia avoided the populist-right breakthroughs seen in the US and Europe for longer because prosperity, stronger institutions and a more equal income distribution absorbed the shocks. Those protections are now weakening. Part one of a two-part analysis.

 

Roger Beale

Why the populist right arrived later in Australia – part one

 

The rise of One Nation has come later than the populist right’s breakthrough in the United States and much of Europe. For a time, Australia seemed an exception. The explanation lies partly in our economic history since 1990: more people shared in growth, unlike the US and UK, our tax and transfer system ensured no appreciable rise in income inequality, and we created no large concentrations of poverty equivalent to the US rust-belt, Appalachians or the UK’s post-industrial north-east.

Also, in spite of the bleats from the right, we were never as ‘woke’ as the US – there were no racial or other minority quotas for higher education or employment, cancel culture existed as a pale shadow of its US equivalents and we avoided the silly extremes like claims that punctuality is a racially repressive concept.

That history helps explain the lag. It does not imply that everyone prospered. Agricultural production has grown while needing fewer workers. A town can have no unemployment crisis and still lose its bank, school, young adults and confidence in its future. Moving to a larger centre helps an individual find work, but can leave the town of origin older and thinner in services. Mining fortunes also differ sharply from those of farming and former manufacturing communities. There is no single regional economy.

For households nationally, the prolonged disposable income slowdown is real, but unlike our international comparators real disposable income for median households has not seen a long period of actual falls. The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey describes strong income growth in the first decade of this century, much weaker progress in the 2010s, a temporary pandemic lift and a more recent squeeze driven by the intersection of inflation, interest rises, increasing mortgage costs and increased tax due to bracket creep (offset by the later tax changes). This story is broadly echoed by the ABS Survey of Income and Housing.

While income inequality hasn’t increased, the same is not true of wealth. Burgeoning superannuation balances and soaring house prices saw the wealth of older Australians climb strongly. Reflecting Piketty’s famous formulation for increasing concentration of wealth, returns to capital (r) strongly exceeded the growth rate of the economy (g) since 2015. The rich and ultra-rich grew richer still. But younger people facing higher housing prices, higher rents and insecure tenure and dealing with university debts despaired of getting on the home ownership ladder and delayed parenthood; mortgagors were exposed to higher interest payments which sharply squeezed disposable income. And everyone faced higher costs for energy and insurance. The divide between people accumulating assets and those reliant on wages has made the promise that work leads to security less credible.

Kos Samaras and Tony Barry’s RedBridge ‘Three Australias’ analysis adds a provocative geographical dimension drawing on the ANU Regional Living Costs Index. Extrapolating from that they estimate that real disposable income indexed to 2015 rose six percentage points in inner metropolitan Australia, but fell eight in outer suburbs and 11 in the regions. Their polling also finds One Nation support rising with distance from city centres. They locate a particularly strong shift to the right among generation X and younger baby boomers without degrees in outer suburban, peri-urban and regional places.

Another regional grievance is the uneven bargain of the energy transition. Developers, skilled workers and host landowners can receive substantial returns from wind, solar and transmission projects; the wider population benefits from electricity supply and lower emissions. But nearby households may see changed landscapes, construction traffic, pressure on local housing or a transmission corridor without a corresponding payment. Short construction booms do not guarantee long-term local jobs. A neighbour who bears an enduring cost deserves a share of the benefit.

Yet economics alone does not drive an electoral destiny. The ANU March 2026 POLIS study finds that the strongest attitudinal predictor of a favourable view of One Nation is populist orientation. Stricter border control and less stringent environmental laws are its most distinctive associated policy preferences. Financial stress contributes, but many equally stressed Australians vote for other parties. In a 2019 Monash survey, financial concerns were only weakly associated with One Nation voting intentions.

The early surge may have drawn heavily from Coalition voters, but a larger One Nation vote cannot be explained by one demographic stereotype. Some voters seek lower migration; some feel ignored; others want a government capable of restoring economic security.

Australia’s populist surge was delayed because our institutions and prosperity absorbed shocks better than in many comparable countries. We had civic capital in the form of strong trust in our institutions compared with other OECD countries – never higher than during the GFC and COVID. While that trust has softened somewhat it is still much higher than in the UK and vastly so than the US. We have had a traditionally pragmatic and unideological attitude to government, treating it as a giant public utility to provide services and security rather than an inherent risk to liberty as in the US. We have compulsory and preferential voting – a bulwark against the triumph of “the worst full of passionate intensity” (W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming). Even when “the best lack all conviction” (ibid.) they are forced to turn out and vote.

Radical-right populism’s late arrival signals that these protections cannot be taken for granted. We need to test the geography of the living-standards squeeze carefully, repair the unfairness people can identify in their lives, and recognise that economic and social policies will succeed politically only if they also address questions of belonging and trust.

The next article considers what such a response would require.

https://johnmenadue.com/post/2026/10/why-the-populist-right-arrived-later-in-australia-part-one/

 

PLEASE VISIT:

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

         RABID ATHEIST.

         WELCOME TO THIS INSANE WORLD….

 

 

the gripes.....

 

Roger Beale

Listen, deliver, rebuild trust: answering the populist right – part two

 

Economic insecurity matters, but it cannot explain the populist challenge alone. Governments must also address migration, belonging and trust while delivering improvements in housing, services, fairness and democratic integrity. Part two of a two-part analysis.

Australians have legitimate worries about housing, services and living costs, particularly in the outer suburbs, peri-urban areas and regions where Kos Samaras finds One Nation’s appeal strongest. Bringing inflation back under control is essential but will hurt some of the households already under pressure. Increasing housing supply and productivity will take time, while there is little fiscal room for relief payments.

Economic policy alone will not answer the challenge posed by the radical populist right. People also disagree about immigration, national identity, gender, climate policy and whose views should receive respect. Treating cultural anxiety as disguised poverty fails to hear it. Accepting the populist account of a country under civilisational siege and its narrow view of what it means to be a good Australian would deepen the division we need to repair.

Australia has advantages. Compulsory and preferential voting encourage parties to persuade a broad electorate. Australians also expect government to deliver useful services and distribute burdens fairly. Competent government can regain confidence, but first it must listen without condescension.

Concern about migration’s pace can coexist with respect for migrants. Scanlon’s 2025 research finds that most people who say immigration is too high still regard multiculturalism as good for Australia. Lowy reports that 73 per cent view cultural diversity positively. Yet September’s Guardian Essential poll found that 55 per cent want the annual migrant intake lowered. Governments cannot dismiss that combination of views.

The government should explain its proposed migration changes, legislate where additional powers are needed, and require Parliament to debate the details. It should say what the changes would do for housing, infrastructure and services, and publish evidence against which those claims can be judged.

It must also explain migration’s contribution. An ageing country needs workers in health and care, construction, agriculture and food production. International students support universities, research and export earnings. The costs and benefits differ across communities, and policy should acknowledge both.

One Nation’s promises demand forensic scrutiny. What would sustained net outward migration mean for GP clinics, hospitals, building sites, farms and universities? How would mass removals be administered lawfully, and at what cost? Ask these questions firmly, with figures and workable alternatives, without calling everyone concerned about immigration a xenophobe.

Housing is the most urgent test of delivery. Faster planning decisions, serviced land, infrastructure finance, sensible use of established suburbs and enough skilled workers must produce completed homes. Review building requirements for demonstrable benefits and examine safe, accessible lower-cost housing options. Renters need greater security; first-home buyers need a path to ownership that does not simply bid up prices.

Regional fairness needs tangible bargains. Communities should influence renewable project siting early, see cumulative impacts assessed and receive durable local benefits. Neighbours bearing substantial visual or amenity costs deserve consideration for compensation alongside landowners receiving leases.

Fiscal honesty matters too. Defence, aged care, disability support and climate adaptation expenditure will keep growing. Revenue needs to keep pace. A credible government should aim for a modest surplus over the business cycle and explain how it will pay for valued services. Serious tax reform could seek fairer returns from resource wealth, revisit the Henry–Garnaut and Productivity Commission proposals for company and resource-rent taxation, and scrutinise concessions favouring asset accumulation. Higher taxes on very high incomes and exceptionally large fortunes deserve open examination, with middle and lower incomes protected. Pretending services can improve while taxes fall feeds disillusionment.

The same fiscal test should be applied to One Nation. Who would pay for its nuclear ambitions or tax cuts? What services or investments would be displaced?

Productivity policy should reach workers, not merely developers of data centres. Building those centres competes for scarce labour; operating them consumes electricity but creates relatively few continuing jobs. The greater opportunity lies in practical AI that helps doctors, nurses, teachers, tradespeople and care workers. Government can support trusted Australian applications while ensuring data-centre projects meet their infrastructure and energy costs.

Cultural belonging needs a positive narrative. We can show pride in democratic institutions, the rule of law, mutual obligation and the fair go while telling the truth about dispossession and exclusion. Citizens must be free to argue about curriculum, gender and migration without being presumed hateful. Minorities must likewise be protected from intimidation and vilification. A shared civic identity cannot require everyone to suppress their differences.

Social media also needs reform. The eSafety Commissioner warns that recommendation systems can narrow feeds until repeated, increasingly extreme claims appear normal. Platforms should provide a non-personalised feed as the default, make personalised recommendations an informed choice, and give independent researchers and regulators access to examine harmful amplification and its monetisation. Political advertising should be transparent. Duties concerning unlawful content should be enforceable. Extending publisher or professional-advice liability to platforms or AI will require careful legal design to protect free expression.

Finally, trust in democratic institutions needs repair. The National Anti-Corruption Commission’s arrangements should be reconsidered, particularly public hearings, third parties and the treatment of pork-barrelling. Tighter election spending caps should capture third-party campaigning as well as party expenditure. Voters who suspect that influence can be bought need evidence that the rules apply fairly. No single policy will defeat the populist right. The democratic centre must hear disagreement, share the costs of change, protect liberal freedoms and deliver improvements on a believable timetable. Reassuring people that Australia is doing well on average will not persuade those whose experience says otherwise. A fair go must be visible in housing, services, opportunity and the integrity of government. Competence becomes a political argument when people can see it working.

https://johnmenadue.com/post/2026/10/listen-deliver-rebuild-trust-answering-the-populist-right-part-two/

 

READ FROM TOP...........

PLEASE VISIT:

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

         RABID ATHEIST.

         WELCOME TO THIS INSANE WORLD….