The weakly supported anniversary statement on the Hague ruling showed how isolated the US and Australia have become on the South China Sea, with ASEAN preferring diplomacy over confrontation.

Distinguished former senior Singaporean diplomat and strategic analyst, Kishore Mhabubani, asked in his 2020 book, whether China has won the geopolitical contest between the US and China.

Geoff Raby

Judging by the embarrassing lack of support for the recent US and Australian push to mark the tenth anniversary of the Hague Judgement on the Philippines-China dispute on the South China Sea (SCS), the answer must surely be a resounding ‘yes’.

The Judgement under Article VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 12 July 2016 was a landmark event. It unanimously found in favour of the Philippines and rejected outright China’s claims of SCS ‘historic rights’. China opted out of the proceedings – as is the right of UNCLOS members – and has refused to accept the Judgement. Beijing has continued to rail against it. It is still disputed among international legal experts.

The Judgement, however, has been used by the US and Australia to justify frequent, in China’s view, incursions into waters and airspaces in the SCS which China claims belong to its territory. These Freedom of Navigation Operations (FNOPs) challenge China’s claims. They have been an ongoing source of tension in the region with considerable risk of miscalculation and escalation on both sides.

Far from contributing to greater security in the region, FNOPs add to regional instability. The US and Australia have made the SCS a major front in their geopolitical contest with China.

Rightly or wrongly – and from the Hague Judgement, in China’s case wrongly – competing claims between China and several Southeast Asian states exist over a handful of atolls, shoals and reefs in the huge area which is the South China Sea. The two most contentious are between the Philippines and China (Scarborough Shoal) and Vietnam and China (Paracel Islands). SCS states also have competing claims against each other.

The reality is that despite the 2016 ruling and years of potentially hazardous FNOPs provocations, nothing has changed other than from time-to-time China has continued to reinforce the geographical features it occupies.

Instead, ASEAN has searched for a diplomatic solution and may finally be close to agreeing on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN members and China for managing the resources of the SCS. This would build on the 2002 ASEAN Declaration of Conduct in the SCS. Neither the US nor Australia are parties to this ASEAN-centred process involving China.

Far from contributing to the search for a diplomatic and hence peaceful resolution of issue, the joint statement sponsored by the US on the 10th Anniversary of the Hague Judgement only served to highlight how little international support there is for it.

The tenth anniversary statement managed to attract only 14 countries. One of which was the Philippines. That’s half the number that supported the Judgement ten years ago: so the argument is going backwards.

But far more significant for Australia’s regional diplomacy, the Philippines was the only ASEAN member to sign on. How far Australian policy is out of step with the region, which we are constantly reminded by the Australian Foreign Minister is the most important for our security, is underscored by the fact that Japan was the only other Asian state to sign on. Conspicuously, India and South Korea did not.

The other signatories were, apart from Germany, Italy and the UK, a grab bag of minor European states. The US, of course, and NZ also signed. No country from Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East, including Israel, signed.

It should also be noted that the US is not a member of UNCLOS but is seeking to hold China accountable to rules to which it is not a party.

And Taiwan has opposed the Hague Judgement all along because it shares exactly the same view as the mainland concerning historical claims to the region.

In short, the anniversary statement by the 14, accounting for just 7 per cent of the UN’s 193 members, was a diplomatic own-goal. In diplomacy it is not a good idea to highlight your weaknesses.

Instead of showing international solidarity against China, it has put up in headlights the isolation of Australia and the other signatories on this issue.

In the circumstances, no statement would have been better than such a weakly supported one. This is not to say that issues of territorial integrity as embodied in the UN Charter are not vitally important. It is to say, as ASEAN does, that where a dispute exists quiet diplomacy and negotiation are preferable to grandstanding.

Australia again finds itself out of step with our immediate region, despite the Foreign Minister’s endless incantations about ‘ASEAN centrality’. It would be interesting to know how much diplomatic capital was spent trying unsuccessfully to get ASEAN on board with the statement.

The oft repeated assertion that China has to be resisted in the SCS because it seeks to control shipping there – when its economic well-being depends crucially on free movement through the region in both directions – is one of the great furphies in geopolitics today.

Instead of recognising the geopolitical realities of the matter, the Australian Foreign Minister has doubled down on what is patently a losing strategy. In her speech at the Philippine Coastguard Headquarters of 21 July she announced a $10m military aid package directed at Australia’s largest trading partner.

It is as if the Foreign Minister is suffering from cognitive dissonance, proclaiming that Australia stands with ASEAN to uphold the Hague Judgement. The Philippines is not ASEAN and ASEAN and much of the rest of the world is not with Australia. China has won.

https://yourdemocracy.net/drupal/node/60680/edit

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In late July, the Philippines did something that has become increasingly rare. It made great powers sit down. Under the chairmanship of the Philippines, the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila and its dense constellation of related gatherings turned the capital into one of the few reliable stages where rivals still appear in the same rooms, exchange views, and keep channels open.

From July 20 to 24, foreign ministers from Southeast Asia, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, India, Europe, and beyond convened against a distinctly unsettled backdrop of escalating hostilities between the US and Iran and rising tensions between Beijing and the Philippines after incidents in the South China Sea.

Yet ASEAN did what it has long done best – it refused to let the friction dictate the terms. The organization offered something that is in very short supply in the modern world of competing geopolitical blocs: a neutral platform where conversation remains possible and practical cooperation continues.

The timing was anything but comfortable. The Middle East conflict has already begun to squeeze energy prices, shipping insurance, and supply-chain calculations across Asia. For a region whose growth remains tightly linked to imported fuel, the risks are very real. Closer to home, the South China Sea incident added another layer of sensitivity to an already delicate maritime equation. All of these were live pressures that tested ASEAN’s claim to remain the primary driving force in the regional architecture.

Yet the Joint Communiqué adopted on July 21 showed neither panic nor denial. Ministers reaffirmed the peaceful resolution of disputes, full respect for international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the principle of ASEAN centrality. Negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea continued, with eyes fixed on further progress ahead of the November Summit.

On Myanmar, the Five-Point Consensus remained the central reference, with discussion focused on measurable steps rather than rhetorical gestures. ASEAN would address its challenges on its own terms, without allowing external turbulence to rewrite the regional script.

What gave the Manila meetings their particular charge was not only the formal agenda but the density of bilateral encounters conducted on its margins. ASEAN does not pretend to mediate every dispute or to impose outcomes on larger powers. Its real craft lies in creating the conditions under which those powers can still speak.

The first-ever meeting of the Quad foreign ministers on the sidelines of ASEAN-led events reaffirmed support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” while explicitly endorsing ASEAN’s unity and centrality. Concurrent sessions of the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and the ASEAN Regional Forum further illustrated the layered architecture that continues to revolve around ASEAN as its institutional core. In a period when many multilateral forums have become arenas of performance, Manila still functioned as a workplace.

Among the most closely watched encounters was the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The American side initiated the talks – an important detail in itself. It signaled that even in a period of sharp differences, Washington recognizes the necessity of sustained contact between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

The discussion covered the Ukraine conflict, the state of bilateral relations, and regional questions of mutual concern. Lavrov set out Russia’s positions with characteristic clarity. Both ministers welcomed the resumption of full contacts between Roscosmos and NASA and spoke in favor of expanding inter-parliamentary exchanges and cultural ties. Rubio indicated that the US remains prepared to play a constructive role in efforts aimed at ending the war in Ukraine.

ASEAN’s external relations received concrete reinforcement. Türkiye was admitted as the organization’s 12th Dialogue Partner, joining a diverse group that already includes China, India, Russia, the US, and the EU. Germany and Qatar were elevated to Sectoral Dialogue Partner status. These decisions reflected continued international confidence in ASEAN’s capacity to manage its own agenda and to offer partners meaningful avenues for engagement without demanding alignment on every geopolitical question.

The 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia provided an additional opportunity to widen the circle. New accessions further illustrated the treaty’s enduring appeal as a foundation for peaceful interstate relations. The steady expansion of ASEAN’s partnership network stands as evidence of practical attraction rather than mere ceremonial goodwill.

Few issues illustrated the collision of distant conflict and regional interest more sharply than energy. The flare-up involving the US and Iran has returned attention to the vulnerability of petroleum supply routes and the need for collective resilience. Ministers highlighted the continuing relevance of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security and the practical advances already achieved under the ASEAN Power Grid.

These mechanisms, developed through years of patient technical work, now function as instruments for managing risk. In the Joint Communiqué, energy security, food security and supply-chain stability were treated central to the region’s ability to absorb external shocks. The emphasis on accelerating implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation reflected a clear understanding: geopolitical turbulence abroad quickly becomes an economic and social challenge at home.

Throughout the meetings, ASEAN ministers returned repeatedly to the concept of centrality. As major-power rivalries intensify globally, the organization’s insistence on remaining the primary driving force in the regional architecture is both a principle and a practical necessity. The Joint Communiqué underscored the determination to project common positions, to leverage ASEAN-led mechanisms, and to contribute to an order anchored in international law.

ASEAN does not seek to exclude external partners or to pretend that differences do not exist. The region’s preferences – for consensus, for non-interference, and for inclusive dialogue – continue to shape the terms of engagement. The presence of representatives from the full spectrum of major powers in Manila was itself a recognition of that reality.

The meetings in the Philippines capital showed that inclusive, ASEAN-centered diplomacy retains practical value even when the global atmosphere grows more polarized. The Lavrov-Rubio conversation, the discussions between Rubio and Wang Yi preparing the ground for higher-level contacts, the expansion of formal partnerships, and the steady attention to energy and maritime cooperation all pointed in the same direction.

The region faces real pressures: an unsettled Middle East, maritime tensions in the South China Sea, and the structural competition between major powers that shapes the wider Indo-Pacific. ASEAN’s response to these pressures, as seen in Manila, is to insist that dialogue is better than conflict and silent treatments, centrality is better than fragmentation, and that patient institution-building is the best path through turbulence.

For an international community searching for spaces where conversation is still possible, the message from Manila was both timely and consequential. When the storm rises, ASEAN still sets the table. And for now, that may be the most valuable service of all.

https://www.rt.com/news/643671-asean-diplomacy-still-happens/

GUSNOTE: TRUSTING RUBIO IS LIKE TRUSTING A FRETTING RATTLE-SNAKE....

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There is an old Chinese saying: "he who has a mind to frame others can easily trump up some charges." Today, even Chinese sunflower seeds have fallen victim of US charges.

The products from China's snack-food producer Chacha Food, meant for ordinary consumers' tables, have been placed alongside politically loaded labels such as "national security" and "forced labor" in the official US documents. This bizarre juxtaposition once again exposes the absurd logic behind Washington's sanctions regime.

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently added 43 Chinese companies to the so-called "Uygur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List." Following this expansion, the number of entities listed has risen to 187, marking the single-largest increase since the list was established. 

A glimpse of the absurdity comes from a closer look at the list: Some Chinese consumer brands in the food and apparel sectors - including Chacha Food, Zhengzhou Synear Food and Septwolves - have also been placed on the list.

"Washington's inclusion of Chinese food and clothing companies on its sanctions list reflects the widening scope of its efforts to contain China," Xin Qiang, deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, told the Global Times. "Such measures, driven not by facts but by speculation and political bias, are increasingly turning normal trade into a target of politicization," Xin added. 

From garlic and tomatoes to sunflower seeds, the US sanctions have expanded from "choking the neck" in the tech sector to "choking the mouth" of ordinary consumers. 

Let's examine Washington's playbook. 

The US claims that the supply chains of the listed Chinese companies may involve sourcing materials from Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with the unsubstantiated allegations of "forced labor," making such products problematic. The pattern is clear: Washington first fabricates a false presumption and places a "forced labor" label on Xinjiang, then expands the scope of restrictions through vague terms, forcing Chinese companies to prove their innocence.

Such an approach violates the basic legal principles of burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. Instead, it has become a practice of "proving your innocence or facing detention and blacklisting." This is nothing more than a form of political coercion and harassment targeting businesses around the world.

From chips to sunflower seeds, US sanctions targets are becoming increasingly "small," while Washington's abuse of the concept of "national security" and its weaponization of sanctions continue to expand. When the sanctions hammer is brought down on a humble sunflower seed, it reveals not strength, but the growing desperation behind Washington's campaign of pressure against China.

"Washington's widening use of "forced labor" allegations reveals the expansion of US unilateralism and hegemonic practices, while also demonstrating that its previous attempts to contain China have failed to deliver the desired results, pushing it to search for ever-new tools of suppression," said Zhou Mi, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

For years, Washington's escalating technology restrictions have failed to undermine the foundations of China's development. Instead, they have accelerated China's pursuit of technological self-reliance and strengthened industrial resilience. Having achieved limited results in high-tech containment, some US policymakers have turned to broader sanctions, attempting to discredit Chinese companies through smear campaigns and political labeling.

Yet such moves are a case of Washington "lifting a rock only to drop it on its own feet in the end." The reckless expansion of sanctions lists and the rising compliance costs imposed on global supply chains will not come without consequences. These measures will ultimately drive up import costs and leave American consumers and small and medium-sized businesses to bear the burden. The use of "presumption of guilt" and "long-arm jurisdiction" may create temporary disruptions, but over the long term, it will only erode confidence in US trade rules and push businesses around the world to seek more stable markets with less political interference.

Repeating a lie does not make it true. Genuine employment records maintained by Chinese companies, market-based supply chains, and the reality that millions of workers voluntarily seek employment opportunities and improve their livelihoods in Xinjiang region cannot be erased by a blacklist issued in Washington.

A fabricated list cannot halt normal trade, nor can it stop Chinese companies from expanding globally. The more Washington turns ordinary goods into political targets, the more it exposes the weakness of its own approach. China will not be deterred by unreasonable suppression.

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202608/1367459.shtml

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