Western military analysts frequently deride and ridicule the Russian military for its slow-pace of advance in taking back territory from Ukraine in 2023 and 2024. But the perceived slow-advance was not the result of poor leadership or bad tactics… It was a manpower issue. On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (which began on February 24, 2022), the Russian Armed Forces significantly outnumbered those of Ukraine in terms of active personnel. But even that number is misleading. If you are going to capture defensive positions held by Ukraine, you need ground forces.

One Reason the Russian Military Advanced Slowly in 2023 and 2024

by Larry C. Johnson

Russia entered the Special Military Operation (SMO) in February 2022 with an estimated 280,000 ground forces, while Ukraine fielded an estimated 130,000. However, only 125,000 Russian troops entered Ukraine at the start of the SMO. Under traditional doctrine, an attacking force should have four times the number of troops in order to have a reasonable chance of defeating an entrenched army. The fact that Russia deployed troops that were a fraction of what was required to conquer Ukraine is prima facie evidence that Putin was not intent on occupying all of Ukraine.

Let me put this in perspective using the Battle of Stalingrad as a benchmark… The Battle of Stalingradwas a turning point in World War II, involving massive Soviet forces across multiple fronts and phases. The term “Soviet ground force” refers to Red Army troops (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.), excluding air and naval elements unless integrated into ground operations. During the initial defense (August–November 1942), the Soviets field ~187,000–200,000 soldiers on the Stalingrad Front under Yeryomenko. The Soviets suffered heavy casualties during those four months and the heavily depleted Soviet units were reinforced by ~50,000 replacements monthly. The Soviets broke the back of the German 6th Army between December 1942 and February 1943 with an additional 1,100,000 soldiers that attacked the German flanks as part of Operation Uranus (November 19–23, 1942), which resulted in the encirclement of the German army.

The Battle of Stalingrad, in the actual city, covered a distance of approximately 35 km from north to south. Compare that to the line of contact in Ukraine today, which is a distance of 1300 km from north to south. Lack of manpower is the primary reason that Russia has opted for a slow, grinding war of attrition against Ukraine, with the Russians using missiles, artillery, drones and glide bombs to compensate for its relatively small number of ground forces. 

Starting in September 2022, the Russian General Staff activated plans to deal with the manpower shortage by mobilizing 300,000 reservists and stepping up efforts to recruit contract soldiers. Russia’s military has grown significantly since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine through partial mobilizations, contract soldiers, and decrees increasing authorized strength.

[see chart for] a breakdown based on the latest available data from November 2025....

Russia has at least tripled the size of its ground forces since the start of the SMO, which explains why Russia is now capturing more territory and conducting more successful attacks all along the line of contact.

There are two other factors that have imposed restraint on Russian ground operations in 2023 and 2024: 1) Training new recruits, and 2) Orders from Putin to minimize Russian casualties. Once a contract is signed or a conscript is inducted, the new soldiers are sent to basic training and then advanced individual training. While the training time was reduced in 2023 in order to get reinforcements to the front more quickly, it appears that Russia now has the luxury of giving new recruits at least six months of training before they see any combat.

Putin’s order to minimize casualties meant that Russian commanders shied away from human wave attacks and developed new tactics that employed saturation bombing of enemy positions with missiles, artillery, drones and glide bombs before small units were inserted to clear Ukrainian fortifications.

https://sonar21.com/one-reason-the-russian-military-advanced-slowly-in-2023-and-2024/

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SEE ALSO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wx8tQpO2N5Q