ASIO deserves a good deal of credit for the cool and professional way in which it gathered and collected information to demonstrate to ministers its belief that members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard had been behind at least two terrorist incidents in Melbourne and Sydney this year. Diplomats not alleged to have known of this have been tossed out as a result.

Jack Waterford

Or perhaps they don’t. We have been given only hazy knowledge of the operation. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese put a blanket over things, but allowed that after the rights of the guilty had been respected, probably in-camera, more information might be allowed to trickle out. I don’t have my hopes up. Albo still thinks that he personally owns the information he is dispensing near the bus stop.

The people who carried out the relevant fire-bombings are said to have been members of Australia’s underworld, particularly involved in Sydney’s gang scene and involved in importing and distributing illegal drugs. But they were not acting in pursuit of their drug dealing, and nor, it seems, is it suggested that Iran or its Revolutionary Guard is involved in the Australian drug scene. Rather, it is said that they were, in effect, contract guns for hire, willing to carry out for a fee tasks paid for by others.

The indications were that the intermediaries were Australian drug gangsters still able to direct some activities in Australia even though they were living in the Middle East in exile. One at least is said to be living in Iraq after being deported from Australia for drug crimes.

It is apparently not suggested that the local criminals who took on the job knew who their client was. In their milieu, paid-for acts of terror and violence against others not known to them are far from uncommon. This includes fire-bombings – in recent times, for example, during wars for control of the booming illegal tobacco market.

It includes home invasions and extortion, bashing and standover activities over drug debts or the proceeds of other criminal activity, including robberies. It includes murder for hire and shootings, including struggles for control over drug distribution, or other areas of organised crime around Melbourne and Sydney. It even involves personality politics, family feuds and grudges among people who live outside the law and are ready to resort to violence to get their way. It also involves, as we learn from time to time, the involvement of violent criminals in the industrial scene, in property development and in local council politics.

The breadth of the activities, and its conjunction with money, violence, clandestine behaviour and illegality is probably enough to explain why it would be possible to recruit people to bomb a Jewish place of worship or burn a Jewish delicatessen. It does not necessarily have to involve antisemitism on the part of the actual perpetrators. Their motive is not the only relative factor, particularly if they are acting for hire or at the direction of people who did have a clear terrorist and antisemitic motive. One might think that even the hirelings would be conscious of the special significance of a synagogue and thus of the antisemitic motive of the ultimate client, but the Sydney bombings suggest that the brains or capacity of those given the job should not be overestimated.

The caravan moves on with, perhaps, the same old con in operation

The roots of the crime seem to reach back to the beginning of the year when an apparently abandoned caravan stocked with what appeared to be explosives was found on the northern outskirts of Sydney. The discovery was hyped up, not least by the very pro-Israeli NSW premier, and was immediately seen as part of a plot to attack Jewish people in Sydney, quite possibly at their places of worship. Some of the investigators, particularly in the Federal Police and ASIO, were somewhat more cautious about letting their imaginations run wild and wondered whether it was a set-up or part of some plot for another purpose.

It turned out that the caravan was a con. And so were several suspicious looking or sounding incidents in which members of the underclass (if not of the underworld) were caught acting suspiciously around obvious Jewish targets. It may well have been that their purposes were nefarious, and perhaps commissioned by third parties, but it was difficult to imagine them as masterminds of a terrorist conspiracy. Then an allegedly major drug gangster was said to have set up most of the incidents, including having the caravan loaded with explosives (if not detonators). Apparently, he planned to offer to trade information about a caravan plot, of which he would claim he had heard, in exchange for a lighter sentence at trial.

Perhaps that contained the germ of a good idea for a professional criminal. But it is almost impossible to imagine that the Iranian plot was completely different and separated from it. The Australians said to have been bargaining with the Revolutionary Guard for an antisemitic bombing campaign are said to have been associated with the man who had been planning the con about a plea deal. It may well be that AFP and ASIO investigators began monitoring such people intensely and stumbled on evidence suggesting that they now had a client wanting terrorism for hire.

Some of that surveillance and bugging, in Australia and abroad, could have observed negotiations, or overheard conversations with people who were (or were thought to be) Iranian revolutionary guards. ASIO head Mike Burgess used careful words about ASIO’s careful examination of the evidence it and the AFP had gathered, and the jury verdict that two attacks, and possibly more, had been directed by Iran. The forms of words he used did not suggest a tip-off by a foreign spy service, nor a deduction from a mosaic of evidence. It suggested a high degree of certainty, and a high degree of ASIO confidence in their conclusion.

No doubt, the ASIO team considered other possibilities. It might have been, for example, an expansion of the original con by the drug lord, if with a few real incidents to increase the sense of dread and fear, either in the Jewish community, or the community at large. That might make his “offer” more attractive. The synagogue firebombing had a dramatic effect on Melbourne’s Jewish community, on Melbourne, and on popular perceptions that Australian Jewish people were under attack, and under attack for being Jews.

The con, if believed, could also craft more pressure on the government. It also quickly became a wider political issue, both in Australia and abroad. The Murdoch media, for example, quickly decided that it showed yet again that Anthony Albanese and the Labor Government was hopelessly inadequate in seeing the antisemitic menace, and were hopelessly trying to appease Muslim opinion. At this stage, Australia was heavily tilted towards the Jewish position, and there was a risk that Albanese would further alienate Australians who favoured Palestine, or who were appalled by the scale of Israel’s retaliation.

There is the possibility that the Revolutionary Guard figures were allies and collaborators of the Australian players. Not only did the criminal syndicate have friends and allies in Iraq and Syria, but it was always possible that some of the Iranians were criminal players too.

Which of the crooks and spooks was being played? Was it us?

There was also a possibility that Iran was playing its own game against Australia rather than against its Jewish population or Israel. Iran has, at times, quite tense relations with Australia, which are aggravated by its traditional relationships with Israel. Or Iran could have been conscious that Pine Gap and other facilities in Australia were helping to target and fire Israeli weapons at Iran, guide Israeli planes on bombing missions, or provide early warning for defensive missile systems. Any of these could be a reason for a pot shot at Australia even if, formally, it had seemed uninvolved in preparations for the Israeli (and later the US) attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.

A cynical Australian security establishment might also wonder if the Iranian figures were being played by Israeli agents, for some sort of long-term Israeli plan. Australia has been a good deal closer to Israel than most of the nations of western Europe. But Israel has a long history of pursuing its own intelligence and security interests without consultation with, or the knowledge of, its allies. In Australia’s case, this has included the use of forged Australian passports for some of its spies or intelligence operatives, and “false flagging” some of its intelligence operations. It has long been obvious that Israeli intelligence agencies are far better informed about events in the area than their neighbours are, and nothing that those neighbours do, even by sabotage and airstrikes, is likely to change that. Some observers believe Iran is fixated on Israel’s very existence and ranks its destruction among its highest national priorities. It arms opponent groups hostile to Israel, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its missile systems are aimed at Israel. It lacks Israel’s military resources but, Israel has long believed, has been dedicated to developing nuclear weapons. Iran has long funded anti-Israeli terrorism – one of the reasons that George W. Bush described Iran as one of the “Axis of Evil” states. Its regime is very repressive and somewhat erratic in its policies. But there are limits to its willingness to commit national suicide. Its “retaliations” against recent US airstrikes were, for example, ritual and not very damaging. They may have salvaged pride; but not to provoke a further frenzy of attacks.

Australians can be reasonably sure that its intelligence findings against Iran did not come from reading its military or diplomatic traffic. We probably do anyway, but using it for more than our own private information would likely upset Five Eyes partners — who use the information more than Australia — and Israel.

One can be reasonably sure that Australia’s knowledge of funny business in Iran did not come directly from Israel. Australia has long shared intelligence with Israel, including through the US. But even out and out Israel advocates in the Australian defence and intelligence community would understand Australian ministers would be highly suspicious of “tips” coming from Israel, and very afraid of being manipulated more than they are.

Iran does have an intelligence apparatus in Australia. Like the Chinese, the Russians, and many Southeast Asian communities, it uses it primarily to spy upon the Iranian diaspora in Australia, especially those disaffected by the Iranian regime – the overwhelming majority. Among these are followers of the Bahai religion who came here as refugees. Because Australia has been a member of the Western alliance, because of its involvement in the war over Ukraine, a near neighbour of Iran, and because it has been an effective ally of Israel, at least until 7 October, Iran would have had an intelligent interest in Australian politics, defence equipment and intelligence matters, even. It would not rate among what Iran would consider the top 50 threats to its sovereignty. If it were minded to do mischief in or to Australia, the use of Australia’s criminal underworld might well seem a cheap but effective — and deniable — option. Thanks heavens the Department of Finance has PwC stitched up.

Australia is not high on the Iranian threat list. Maybe at number 50

AFP and ASIO press conference hints suggest that the guilty parties are safely out of our jurisdiction. And unlikely ever to return. That might suit everyone. Actual criminal prosecutions — particularly of the top dog class — are usually very difficult, and often unsuccessful. Too many things can go wrong and do. And what can seem very politically convenient at one moment can be dreadfully embarrassing at another. ASIO’s track record in prosecuting alleged traitors and spies is not good and, if we merely wanted to set an example, we would not start in Iran. Or Iraq. In terms of the risk to the national interest, reducing spying by China, Israel, the US, Indonesia, India, Britain and France might better pay back the investment.

Those on the bottom rung, who did the bidding of their exiled masters, can be successfully prosecuted to the point that honour is satisfied. Otherwise, it is probably better to posture, to splutter defiance, to denounce the evil of what they do. And then to tell Major Renault to round up the usual suspects.

Republished from The Canberra Times, 3o August 2025